The language of Connecticut General Statutes §51-183c is clear and unambiguous and explicitly prohibits a judge who tries a case that is thereafter reversed to try the case on remand. The defendant, Enrico Vaccaro, appealed from the judgment of the trial court awarding the plaintiff, J. William Gagne, Jr., attorneys' fees and from a judgment finding the defendant in contempt. The defendant claimed, successfully, that because the trial court, DeMayo, J., originally rendered judgment on the plaintiff's motion for appellate attorneys' fees and the Appellate Court reversed that judgment, on remand Judge DeMayo was required to recuse himself pursuant to C.G.S. §51-183c. The Appellate Court agreed and reversed the judgments. C.G.S. §51-183c provides, "[n]o judge of any court who tried a case without a jury in which a new trial is granted, or in which the judgment is reversed by the Supreme Court, may again try the case. No judge of any court who presided over any jury trial, either in a civil or criminal case, in which a new trial is granted, may again preside at the trial of the case." The language of C.G.S. §51-183c is clear and unambiguous. The statute explicitly prohibits a judge who tries a case that is thereafter reversed to try the case on remand. There was no reasonable manner in which the language of the statute could be interpreted to yield a different result. C.G.S. §51-183c was applicable to this case and was not properly followed. Because Judge DeMayo rendered judgment on the plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees and the Appellate Court reversed that judgment, on remand, a different judge should have presided over the case as requested by the defendant. The case was remanded for a new hearing on the plaintiff's motion for appellate attorneys' fees, discovery objections and the motion for contempt.

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