Although the substitute information did not specifically state the element of operation on a public highway for a conviction of operating a motor vehicle without a driver's license in violation of C.G.S. §14-36(a), it provided the defendant with the statutory section under which he was charged and the time and place of the incident, which was sufficient to inform him of the charges against him. Following a jury trial, Dean Vlahos was convicted of operating a motor vehicle without a driver's license in violation of C.G.S. §14-36(a). Pursuant to a part B information, his sentenced was enhanced under C.G.S. §14-36(h)(2)(B).  Vlahos appealed raising multiple claims including that the information failed to state an offense because an element of C.G.S. §14-36(a), operation on a public highway, was omitted. The Appellate Court rejected the claims on appeal and affirmed the judgment. Although the substitute information did not specifically state the element of operation on a public highway, it provided the defendant with the statutory section under which he was charged as well as the time and place of the incident. The state's inclusion of these items in the information was sufficient to inform the defendant of the charges against him. The defendant also unsuccessfully claimed that it was improper for the state to charge him under C.G.S. §14-36(a), rather than C.G.S. §14-41(c), driving with an expired license or C.G.S. §14-215b, driving after the expiration of a period of suspension. He claimed that C.G.S. §14-36(a) does not apply to persons who previously have obtained valid Connecticut driver's licenses but only to person s who have never obtained valid Connecticut driver's licenses. However, the language of the statute does not limit its applicability to only those persons who have not obtained an initial driver's license as claimed. C.G.S. §14-41(c) provides that when a person has allowed a license to expire, he or she has a grace period of 60 days to renew and, after the 60 day period, C.G.S. §14-36 "shall apply." C.G.S. §14-36 applied and the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. Further, the defendant's prior convictions that occurred more than three years before the present offense properly were considered in the imposition of penalties under C.G.S. §14-36(h)(2).

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