An inverse condemnation takes place when the application of a regulation: 1.) amounts to a practical confiscation, because a property cannot be used for any reasonable purpose; or 2.) wrongly infringes on the owner's reasonable expectation of use and enjoyment, so as to constitute a taking. Allegedly, the City of Hartford urged the plaintiff limited liability company to demolish the Firestone building and, after the building was demolished, McDonald's Corp. agreed to a ground lease. Allegedly, the LLC and McDonald's Corp. worked together to meet the requests of the director of planning for the city, Roger O'Brien. O'Brien sought to incorporate a brick facade, move the building closer to the street and install a traffic signal. Allegedly, O'Brien suggested an alternative, city-owned location for a McDonald's restaurant and indicated that the city-owned location would receive approval from the city. O'Brien also allegedly encouraged individuals to protest the plaintiff's location and pursued a land-use restriction at the plaintiff's location that restricted the LLC to education, public administration, health care and religious uses. (The city claimed that the property is located in a downtown development district that permits restaurants without drive-thru windows.) The LLC sued the city and O'Brien, alleging inverse condemnation and tortious interference with business expectancy. The court agreed with the defendants that the plaintiff failed to adequately allege that a final decision existed on the plaintiff's application. A "plaintiff is not entitled to judicial review of the merits of its regulatory takings claim until he has met the requirement of establishing the finality of the agency determination," pursuant to A&F Construction Inc. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, a 2000 decision of the Connecticut Appellate Court. Here, the plaintiff LLC did not allege it received a final decision on an application. The court granted the motion to strike the plaintiff's inverse-condemnation count. The court also found that the plaintiff's tortious-interference-with-business-expectancy count was moot.