The "nolle clock" in Connecticut General Statutes §54-142a(c) is triggered by the prosecution's request for a continuance and, here, where nothing in the record indicated that a four year delay in proceedings was attributable to the prosecution, the provisions of C.G.S. §54-142a(c) were inapplicable. In connection with an incident in 2006, Edward Nelson was convicted following a jury trial in 2011 of interfering with an officer and breach of the peace in the second degree. Nelson appealed, claiming that the trial court improperly denied two motions to dismiss asserting the statute of limitations in C.G.S. §54-193(b) and an unreasonable delay in prosecution given C.G.S. §54-142a(c). The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment. The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to dismiss claiming that the prosecutor's failure to sign the original information rendered the information defective such that his prosecution did not begin within the one year statute of limitations in C.G.S. §54-193(b). A warrantless arrest constitutes the commencement of a criminal prosecution against an arrestee for statute of limitation purposes. Accordingly, the defendant's warrantless arrest the day the offenses allegedly occurred was a "timely prosecution of the defendant." Practice Book §36-11 notes that the absence of a required signature on an information is a "waivable, nonjurisdictional defect." Precedent establishes that the signature's central purpose is authentication. The trial court also did not err in denying the defendant's motion to dismiss claiming that a nolle prosequi had entered by operation of law under C.G.S. §54-142a(c). The "nolle clock" in C.G.S. §54-142a(c) is triggered by the prosecution's request for a continuance. The defendant elected to proceed to trial on March 15, 2007 and the case was placed on the "one hour list." Nothing in the record indicated that the delay in the proceedings between March 15, 2007 and March 30, 2011, was attributable to the prosecution. Thus, the court did not err in concluding that C.G.S. §54-142a(c) was inapplicable. The court did not violate the defendant's due process rights by declining to charge on a common law privilege to resist unlawful police conduct and self defense. Under the self-defense statute, C.G.S. §53a-23, the illegality of an arrest is not a defense to interfering with an officer. No warrantless entry into the defendant's home occurred for any common law privilege to resist arrest instruction.

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