A court possesses the discretion to apply a "relaxed interpretation" of the 30-day time period in which to file a motion intervene, pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes §31-293(a). Allegedly, certified notice was sent to the plaintiff's employer, on or about April 20, 2012, and the employer moved to intervene on July 10, 2012. The plaintiff objected to the employer's motion to intervene, because it was not filed timely, within 30 days, pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes §31-293(a). The statute provides, "If the employee, the employer or the custodian of the Second Injury Fund brings an action against such person, he shall immediately notify the others, in writing, by personal presentation or by registered or certified mail, of the action and of the name of the court to which the writ is returnable, and the others may join as parties plaintiff in the action within thirty days after such notification, and, if the others fail to join as parties plaintiff, their right of action against such person shall abate." Due process can be invoked, to prevent the deprivation of rights and property interests that an intervenor is entitled to under the Workers' Compensation Act, pursuant to the Connecticut Supreme Court's 1997 decision, Worsham v. Greifenberger. Although more than 30 days passed, the court elected to apply a "relaxed interpretation" of the 30-day time period. The statutory language, which includes the phrase "may join as parties plaintiff," is permissive and provides a basis to be lenient when interpreting the 30-day time period. The court granted the employer's motion to intervene. 

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